Investor overview · Pre-launch
A team needs someone to shoot the game. A conference needs a crew. A brokerage needs the listing shot by Friday. Today all three find that person in a Facebook group. ShotlistX makes verified creators searchable, bookable and available — with their calendar attached, in whichever market they work.
This is a working product demonstration. ShotlistX has not launched — every creator, job and review in the demo is fictional, and every figure on this page that is not sourced is labelled with where it came from.
The problem
Not a technology gap — a coordination gap. Both sides of this market are actively looking for each other and failing to meet.
A club director needs a videographer for Saturday. A conference producer needs a crew of three in Chicago. A listing agent needs a property shot before Friday. All three ask in a group, get three names, and DM strangers on Instagram. No rates, no availability, no reviews, no contract, and no bench when someone falls through.
A creator's next job comes from whoever happened to tag them. They have no way to be found for the work they actually specialise in, no way to publish availability, and no way to be discovered outside their own metro — and the referral networks that do exist are locked inside a single market.
Commissioned visual content is fragmented and hyper-local in every market it appears in. The money moves through Venmo and handshake invoices. The workflow problem is identical whether the subject is a game, a keynote, a tour date or a house — but the tooling is built once per industry, if at all.
Who owns the footage, for how long, and where it may run is settled by assumption far more often than by agreement. A brokerage keeps using listing photos after the listing ends. A brand quietly promotes an organic clip into a paid ad. This is the most common dispute in the industry and it is almost never written down.
The solution
Every one of these exists today as a separate product, a spreadsheet, or nothing at all. ShotlistX is the first to put them in one place for this vertical.
How it works
Each step below opens the working demo. Claims are cheap; a product you can click is not.
Filter by discipline, sport, metro, rate and — critically — who is actually free on your date.
Open in demo →02Every creator keeps a live calendar. No more three-day email threads to learn someone is booked.
Open in demo →03Agree scope and rate in-thread, confirm the date, and pay through the platform.
Open in demo →04Every completed booking produces a rating. Reputation compounds, and rebooking takes one click.
Open in demo →Two-sided
Supply is multi-discipline — one creator shoots, edits and designs — which lets a single profile serve several demand segments.
Market
A number you can interrogate is worth more than a big one you can't. Expand any figure to see exactly what it assumes.
The previous deck carried a "$10B+" sports figure that was never sourced. Summing eight markets would multiply that error rather than fix it, and the honest position is that a defensible cross-market TAM requires a bottom-up build-up we have not done. The two sourced industry figures above are what we can actually stand behind today. Deliberately left unsized rather than filled with a number that would not survive a question.
Output of the interactive model below at its default assumptions. Moves with every slider — it is a consequence of the inputs, not an independent claim. Note it is modelled on beachhead-first sequencing, not on eight simultaneous market launches.
There is no shortage of ways to hire a videographer today — they are just all bad, and in two of our markets the incumbent is genuinely strong. Any claim of "no competitors" would mean we hadn't looked.
No availability, no verification, no rates, no reviews, no contract. Discovery is whoever posts most. Still the real incumbent in every market on this list.
Trusted but tiny, and locked inside one market — agent to agent, coach to coach. Caps supply at whoever your network already knows and collapses when they're booked.
A shrinking category, not a safe one to be mistaken for. No concept of a game date, a run-of-show, a photo pass, an MLS-compliant unbranded cut, or a licence that expires when a listing does.
The hardest competitive fact we face: Zillow acquired Aryeo and now gives a tier away free, monetising listing content downstream. Per-listing tools run $1–$5. A subscription cannot outprice free — so property is a market we serve, not one we lead with.
Take-rate or fixed-price managed models, and Snappr has moved substantially toward selling AI image credits rather than booking humans. Soona validates the pricing shape we want: subscription buys turnaround and workflow, not the transaction.
TKWW owns demand with ~900K listed professionals and vendor-advertising subscriptions; HoneyBook already sells creator-side SaaS at $29–$109/mo with no take rate. Both flanks of our model are occupied here, which is why weddings is planned rather than early.
Own registration, ticketing and attendee data — and have no creator-booking layer at all. The clearest structural gap the research found, in the market that most resembles the sports product already built.
Own team management, film and scheduling, but sell software to organizations. Neither is a talent marketplace with independent creator supply.
ShotlistX is the booking and production layer for commissioned visual content — vertical in supply, horizontal in demand. The workflow is one product; the pricing unit, the credentials and the rights are different in every market it serves.
Business model
Creators keep 100% of their rate. Revenue is subscriptions plus small, high-margin add-ons on an existing subscriber base.
For working professionals who want a full pipeline.
3-day free trial
For teams, schools, clubs, tournaments and brands who hire.
3-day free trial
Add-ons sold to people who already pay. Near-zero marginal cost, and they raise ARPU without raising the subscription price.
With no take rate, ShotlistX has no direct economic stake in payments staying on-platform — so "let's just Venmo it" is the primary revenue leak. Payment share has to be earned through escrow, contracts and dispute protection rather than mandated by a fee. That is a deliberate choice in favour of creator trust and a clean recurring-revenue story, and it is the first thing worth pressure-testing.
Unit economics
Every input below is an assumption, not a projection. Rather than defend one set of numbers, here is the model — find the conversion rate you'd need to believe.
Every creator starts on a 3-day free trial. This is total registered creators, not paying ones.
Share of registered creators who stay on Creator Pro after the trial. 12% assumes the message gate converts well.
Schools, clubs, tournament operators and brands with an account.
Higher than the creator side: an org only creates an account when it has a job to fill, so intent is stronger.
Share of paying subscribers buying at least one boost in a given month, at a blended ~$8 per purchase.
Outputs are arithmetic on the inputs to the left — no growth curve, no churn model, no seasonality. It answers "what does this look like at scale X", not "when do we get there".
Assumes video storage and egress are the dominant COGS line. With no permanent free tier, stored media belongs to paying or trialing accounts.
Assumes supply is acquired largely organically through creator referrals and feed distribution, with paid spend concentrated on the org side. Unvalidated — no spend has occurred.
Derived from the CAC and ARPU assumptions above. Inherits their uncertainty.
Retention is the single least-supported assumption in this model — the product has never been in market, so there is no churn data of any kind.
Traction
ShotlistX has not launched. There are no users, no revenue and no signed customers. This site is a working product demonstration, and every profile, job and review in it is fictional.
The ask
Raise amount, allocation and milestones are set by the founder and are intentionally left blank in this demo rather than filled with placeholder figures that could be mistaken for real targets.
Appendix
Collected in one place so nothing on this deck has to be taken on trust.
The previous deck carried a "$10B+" sports figure that was never sourced. Summing eight markets would multiply that error rather than fix it, and the honest position is that a defensible cross-market TAM requires a bottom-up build-up we have not done. The two sourced industry figures above are what we can actually stand behind today. Deliberately left unsized rather than filled with a number that would not survive a question.
Output of the interactive model below at its default assumptions. Moves with every slider — it is a consequence of the inputs, not an independent claim. Note it is modelled on beachhead-first sequencing, not on eight simultaneous market launches.
Assumes video storage and egress are the dominant COGS line. With no permanent free tier, stored media belongs to paying or trialing accounts.
Assumes supply is acquired largely organically through creator referrals and feed distribution, with paid spend concentrated on the org side. Unvalidated — no spend has occurred.
Derived from the CAC and ARPU assumptions above. Inherits their uncertainty.
Retention is the single least-supported assumption in this model — the product has never been in market, so there is no churn data of any kind.
The convenient version of this pitch says a photographer who shoots a football game can also shoot a house, a concert and a product table. The evidence does not support it — gear, credentials and referral networks all diverge, and specialists out-earn generalists. What IS portable is post-production and distribution supply, plus the workflow itself. The claim has been narrowed accordingly, and it is falsifiable: sample 200 creator profiles in one metro and count how many list two or more capture markets. Under 25% and the cross-market supply story is dead — though the shared-workflow story survives either way.
A brokerage books 40 shoots a month; a wedding couple books once in their life. A flat tier cannot serve both. The intended answer is to price on intensity rather than on market — included volume per tier with overage — and to let the market determine the unit rather than the plan. Not yet built into the pricing page beyond the tier structure that exists.
The data model supports eight; the go-to-market does not, and the two should not be confused. Every marketplace post-mortem worth reading describes the same failure — expanding before liquidity existed in market one. Sports is labelled the beachhead and the rest are labelled expansion or planned, in the data rather than in a footnote, specifically so this cannot be quietly overstated later.
The hardest question on this list. Zillow acquired Aryeo and gives a tier away free, monetising listing content downstream at $300–$1,150 per listing; competing per-listing tools charge $1–$5. A subscription cannot outprice free. Property is included because the workflow genuinely fits and buyers are continuous, but leading with it would be a mistake, and the pricing model there probably cannot be the same one used elsewhere.
With no transaction fee, the platform has no direct economic stake in payments staying on-platform. Payment share has to be earned through escrow, contracts and dispute protection rather than mandated.
The unsourced "$10B+" sports TAM inherited from the original concept deck has been removed rather than replaced with a larger unsourced number, which is the direction a multi-vertical pivot naturally pulls. What remains are two citable industry figures and an explicit "not yet sized" for the cross-market total. A defensible number needs a bottom-up build-up per market, and until that exists the honest answer is the absence of one.